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Note
Continental Casualty Co. v. Robsac
Industries: Federal Declaratory
Judgment Actions and Parallel State
Proceedings-A Fifth Branch of
Abstention
In order to deter parallel state and federal suits involving the
same parties and issues in declaratory judgment actions, the Bril-
lhart doctrine requires a balancing test to determine the propriety
of exercising federal jurisdictions to grant relief. This standard
was expanded and crystallized in 1991. In Continental Casualty
Co. v. Robsac Industries, the Ninth Circuit held that federal dis-
trict courts should generally decline to exercise jurisdiction in in-
surance coverage and other suits brought under the Federal
Declaratory Judgments Act. The Robsac court replaced the for-
mer fact-specific balancing test with a general rule. The Robsac
analysis of declaratory judgment actions involving parallel state
court suits filed by particular categories of litigants whom the
court deems "reactive" translates into a per se rule favoring fed-
eral court abstention. Whether Robsac's new standard will in fact
deter federal courts from exercising their congressionally-con-
ferred jurisdiction is unclear.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ninth Circuit recently narrowed federal jurisdiction by ex-
panding a new branch of abstention doctrine. In Continental Casu-
alty Co. v. Robsac Industries,1 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
1. Continental Casualty Co. v. Robsac Indus., 947 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1991).
Circuit held that federal district courts should generally decline to
exercise jurisdiction in insurance coverage and other suits brought
under the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act 2 presenting only state
law issues during the pendency of parallel state proceedings. The
split decision crystallized a fifth branch of abstention doctrine by es-
tablishing a general rule of abstention during the pendency of paral-
lel state court proceedings, with limited exceptions.3
By formulating a strict standard for federal court jurisdiction in
declaratory relief actions, Robsac effectively creates a per se rule
which virtually slams shut the doors of the federal courts. Litigants
who may otherwise satisfy federal jurisdictional requirements lose
access to a federal forum and must litigate in a state court.
The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act is a procedural device
that enlarges the range of remedies available to the federal courts.
The Act seeks to provide an immediate forum for adjudication of
rights and obligations in an actual controversy so that parties may
resolve disputes with expediency and economy in their entirety.4 This
discretionary remedy is liberally construed to accomplish its intended
purpose.5 As a discretionary procedural device, the Act does not in-
crease the United States district courts' jurisdiction over substantive
rights of litigants or create any new causes of action.6 Therefore, to
invoke declaratory relief under the Act, a plaintiff must establish
federal jurisdiction independently.
Application of the Act during the pendency of parallel state pro-
ceedings can prove particularly complex. Concerns of federalism, 7
comity,8 and fairness require a balancing of competing values to de-
termine whether to grant federal declaratory relief.9 Congress has
accorded the district courts great discretion in deciding whether to
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988).
3. 947 F.2d at 1374. "Courts should generally decline to assert jurisdiction in in-
surance coverage and other declaratory relief actions presenting only issues of state law
during the pendency of parallel proceedings in state court." Id.
4. Duggins v. Hunt, 323 F.2d 746, 748 (10th Cir. 1963).
5. Sherwood Medical Indus., Inc. v. Deknatel, Inc., 512 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir.
1975); Pizitz, Inc. v. Pizitz Mercantile Co., 467 F. Supp. 1089, 1097 (N.D. Ala. 1979);
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Benjamin F. Shaw Co., 465 F. Supp. 331, 333
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
6. Buckley v. United States, 494 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (E.D. Ky. 1980); Reiter v.
Illinois Nat'l Cas. Co., 213 F.2d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1954).
7. This refers to the interrelationships among the states and relationship between
the states and the federal government. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 315 (5th ed. 1983).
8. [Comity is] a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact
that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, a
continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the
States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in
their separate ways.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
9. Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1991).
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exercise their power under existing law.1" Circuits have split over
whether parallel state proceedings require abstention and what the
appropriate standard of review for the district court's exercise of dis-
cretion should be.1 In establishing essentially a per se rule, Robsac
has deprived district courts the discretion to hear such disputes al-
ready pending in state courts.
This Note examines the Robsac decision in light of abstention
doctrine history and previous Ninth Circuit decisions. This Note
then explores the potential impact of the Robsac decision with re-
spect to enlarging this branch of abstention doctrine and the compet-
ing concerns over the retention of district court discretion in granting
declaratory relief.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Abstention Doctrine
There is a widespread belief that the forum of litigation may con-
tribute as much to the outcome of a case as the underlying merits of
the case.' 2 For example, a foreign litigant may seek a neutral federal
forum attempting to avoid local prejudice. This belief accounts for
the importance of the abstention doctrines that act as a bar to the
10. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942).
11. Some circuits have concluded that the decision to abstain in declaratory judg-
ment actions because of parallel litigation in another forum is limited by the Colorado
River abstention doctrine. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); see also Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1986). Others follow the view that the discre-
tion generated by the Declaratory Judgments Act and recognized by the Supreme Court
in Brillhart remains unaffected by the "exceptional circumstances" analysis of Colorado
River. See, e.g., Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213, 1224 (3rd Cir.
1989). Still others have tried to fashion some form of "middle ground" between the two
positions. See, e.g., Fuller Co. v. Ramon I. Gil, Inc., 782 F.2d 306, 308-11 (1st Cir.
1986).
12. See, e.g., David J. McCarthy, Preclusion Concerns as an Additional Factor
When Staying a Federal Suit in Deference to a Concurrent State Proceeding, 53 FORD-
HAMt L. REV. 1183, 1198 (1985).
There are several reasons for Congress' determination that the federal judicial
power should be expanded to the limits permissible by the Constitution ....
First, it was thought necessary to enable a plaintiff to avoid the perceived
prejudices of a local forum. A second reason was to deal with local opposition
to, or disregard of, the federal law.
Id. at 1198 n.66. See also David A. Sonenshein, Abstention: The Crooked Course of
Colorado River, 59 TUL. L. REV. 651 (1985) ("[I]n enacting the statute ... [C]ongress
has deemed the federal courts, with life-tenured judges who are less subject to the vagar-
ies and pressures of local public opinion, to be an option well worth preserving for the
litigant."); Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the
Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 112 (1984) ("The Supreme Court has recognized
federal forum. In abstention cases, a federal court declines to exer-
cise jurisdiction it unquestionably possesses in favor of a state court's
exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, the party who has chosen to litigate in
a federal forum is forced into a state court.
Abstention is controversial because it hampers a plaintiff's access
to a federal court, even though the federal court has jurisdiction over
the parties and the case.13 Sometimes abstention merely delays fed-
eral resolution. An issue initially presented to a state court may re-
turn to federal court for final resolution of federal questions. 14 More
commonly, however, abstention abdicates jurisdiction by the lower
federal courts. Issue and claim preclusion principles generally bar
federal reconsideration of questions resolved in state court
proceedings.15
Commentators almost uniformly condemn the Supreme Court's
abstention doctrines.' Abstention consistently relegates federal cases
to the state courts despite the virtually "unflagging obligation" of
the important interrelations between congressional jurisdictional allocations and substan-
tive congressional programs ...."); Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Con-
stitutional Litigation, 22 Wt. & MARY L. REV. 605, 607 (1981) (discussing the
argument that enforcing federal constitutional principles should be regarded as the task
of the federal courts).
The federal courts are to be preferred because, we are told, federal judges are
more competent and expert in adjudicating issues of federal law; are more in-
dependent in resisting popular and political pressures; and are likely, through
institutional perspective, to be even more sensitive to claims of federal right
and more zealous and conscientious in upholding them against assertions of
state power, than are state judges.
Bator, supra, at 607.
13. The controversial nature of abstention doctrines arises in great part from the
pervasive sentiment that state courts are less receptive than are federal courts to federal
claims of right.
14. This is the case with Pullman abstention. See Railroad Comm'n. v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The Texas Railroad Commission issued orders requiring cer-
tain numbers of white conductors on each train. A group of black railroad employees
sued in federal district court claiming this order violated their Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Id. at 497-98. In Pullman, the Supreme Court ordered federal abstention so the
Texas courts could determine whether the Commission had authority to issue the order
under Texas law. If the Texas courts decided no, the constitional issue became moot. If
the state courts upheld the Commission's authority under Texas law, the case could then
return to federal court for resolution of the federal issue. Id. at 501.
15. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984);
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90 (1980); see also, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988) ("judicial proceedings of any court of
any such State . . .shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States ... as they shall have by law or usage in the courts of such State... from
which they are taken").
16. The critics suggest that the entire concept of abstention is antithetical to the
federal courts' obligation to exercise the jurisdiction granted them. See generally Linda
S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 77 GEo. LJ. 99
(1986); David A. Sonenshein, The Crooked Course of Colorado River, 59 TUL. L. REV.
651 (1985); Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the
Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. (1984); Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Ab-
stention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530 (1989).
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federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction bestowed on them by Con-
gress and plaintiffs' repeated choice of federal fora in which to vindi-
cate their federal rights.'"
The Supreme Court justifies abstention doctrines by relying pri-
marily upon a concern for comity and federalism interests.', Comity
refers to the relations between coordinate state and federal judicial
systems. When federal courts decide issues that state courts could
resolve, the federal courts may implicitly call into question the abil-
ity or willingness of state courts to apply federal law faithfully. 9
Federalism, in turn, refers to the relations between state and federal
sovereigns. The federal courts could usurp the role of state courts in
addressing matters of state policy. 20 Finally, sound judicial adminis-
tration raises concerns: state courts, and the litigants before them,
should not be subject to the disruptive effect of parallel or pre-emp-
tive federal proceedings.2'
17. Generally, as between state and federal courts, the rule is that 'the pen-
dency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the
same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction .. . .' This difference in this
general approach between state-federal concurrent jurisdiction and wholly fed-
eral concurrent jurisdiction stems from the virtually unflagging obligation of
the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (emphasis added).
18. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (holding that absent speci-
fied circumstances, a federal court should refrain from enjoining an ongoing state crimi-
nal proceeding).
19. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 446 (1977) (noting that when a federal
court proceeds with its case rather than remitting litigants to their remedies in a pending
state enforcement suit, it negatively reflects upon the state's ability to adjudicate federal
claims); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (federal court intervention in
state criminal proceedings may be interpreted as negatively reflecting upon state courts
ability to enforce constitutional principles).
20. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979) (federal intervention may
"prevent the informed evolution of state policy by state tribunals"); Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 609 (1975) (federal intervention prevents states from hearing consti-
tutional objections to state policies); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327-28, 334
(1943) (federal intervention hinders state implementation of important regulatory
policies).
21. Abstention is also appropriate where there have been presented difficult
questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import
whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar .... In some
cases, however, the state question itself need not be determinative of state pol-
icy. It is enough that exercise of federal review of the question in a case ...
would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to
a matter of substantial public concern.
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814 (see cases cited therein) (citations omitted).
B. Main Catagories of Abstention Doctrine
Although the abstention doctrines defy strict categorization, the
cases relying on the abstention principle are commonly divided into
several doctrinal groups. First, the Pullman22 abstention doctrine
generally requires a lower federal court to stay its hand to permit
state courts to resolve unsettled state law questions which may obvi-
ate the need to reach the federal questions presented in a case. Sec-
ond, the Younger2 3 abstention doctrine holds that, absent specified
circumstances, a federal court should not enjoin an ongoing state
criminal proceeding. Third, the Burford24 abstention doctrine re-
quires abstention to avoid federal court interference in complex state
administrative schemes. Fourth, the Colorado River" abstention
doctrine, commonly called "fourth branch abstention," counsels fed-
eral court restraint when parallel state court proceedings and "ex-
ceptional circumstances" exist.
This fourth branch of abstention stands for the principle that fed-
eral courts may, in their discretion, abstain from exercising properly
invoked federal jurisdiction for reasons of judicial economy or wisejudicial administration. This branch has often been applied to de-
claratory judgment actions.26
In creating a new branch of abstention based on considerations of
wise judicial administration, the Supreme Court in Colorado River
Conservation District v. United States emphasized the "virtually un-
flagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction
given to them," and held that "only the clearest of justifications will
22. Pullman abstention was developed in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941). Under this doctrine, a federal court will delay its exercise of jurisdic-
tion to allow a state court to interpret an ambiguous state statute subjected to a constitu-
tional challenge. The doctrine is invoked only when the challenged statute is capable of
at least two constructions, one which would render the law unconstitutional, and one
which would not. After the state court has definitively interpreted the statute, the case
may ultimately return to the federal court for adjudication of the constitutional claim.
23. Younger abstention was developed in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Under this doctrine, a federal court may not enjoin state criminal proceedings, even to
protect federal constitutional rights.
24. Burford abstention was developed in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315(1943). This doctrine requires a federal court to dismiss a case involving an area of
traditional state power when the exercise of federal jurisdiction would have a disruptive
effect upon state efforts to establish a coherent policy regarding a matter of substantial
public concern. To invoke this doctrine, state law must be unsettled and the matter must
bear on a substantial state policy. Id. at 332-34.
25. Colorado River abstention was developed in Colorado River Water Conserva-
lion Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Although the presence of a parallel
state court proceeding generally does not justify dismissal of a federal suit, under this
doctrine "exceptional circumstances" may justify a stay, which is often functionally a
dismissal.
26. See supra note 11.
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warrant dismissal."2 The Court further noted that although wise ju-
dicial administration permitted dismissal of a federal suit because of
a pending concurrent state proceeding, this was under circumstances
considerably more limited than those appropriate under ordinary ab-
stention doctrines.2" The Court developed an "exceptional circum-
stances" test: a balancing test with the balance weighted heavily in
favor of the exercise of federal jurisdiction. 9 Furthermore, under
Colorado River abstention, appellate courts review the district
court's exercise of such discretion under an "abuse of discretion"
standard. 30
A different but related doctrine also applies to declaratory judg-
ment actions. This doctrine was first set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co."1 By its express
terms, the Declaratory Judgments Act makes the granting of declar-
atory relief discretionary.32 Because of this feature, a whole new
branch of abstention developed. In contrast, generally when litigants
have satisfied the federal jurisdictional requirements, the district
courts' exercise of congressionally-defined jurisdiction is mandatory,
barring some basis for abstention.3
C. Ninth Circuit Principles
In the Ninth Circuit prior to 1991, the principles established by
the United States Supreme Court in Colorado River governed the
propriety of granting declaratory relief in the face of pending paral-
lel state proceedings. 34 Because Colorado River required "extraordi-
nary circumstances" to justify abstention, only narrowly defined
situations warranted such action.35
In Chamberlain v. Allstate Insurance Co.,36 however, the Ninth
Circuit recognized the "special status" of declaratory relief suits and
27. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-18.
28. Id.; see supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
29. Id.; Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 16,
19 (1983).
30. Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 772 F.2d 534, 540 (9th Cir. 1985);
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 19.
31. 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988).
33. See supra note 17.
34. Mobil Oil Corp., 772 F.2d at 540-41; see also Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The Colorado River test, however, does not
apply where the Declaratory Judgments Act is involved." (citations omitted)).
35. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-18.
36. Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1366 n.1.
held that Colorado River abstention principles do not apply to suits
brought under the Declaratory Judgments Act.37 The court held that
the principles set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Brill-
hart determine whether declaratory relief is warranted. 38 Brillhart,
however, provided a much lower threshold of justification necessary
to warrant abstention. 9
Brillhart involved an unsettled technical issue of state law. 40 The
Brillhart opinion had two important features. Brillhart established
both a three-prong balancing test for determining when abstention is
appropriate and a de novo standard of review in federal declaratory
relief cases.4
The Brillhart test considers: (1) the interest in avoiding needless
determinations of state law, (2) the interest in avoiding forum shop-
ping, and (3) the interest in avoiding duplicative litigation. 42 In
Brillhart, the Supreme Court remanded the issue to the district
court to determine whether jurisdiction was proper in light of the
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1366-67.
39. Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495; Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367.
40. Brillhart involved the scope of state garnishment proceedings. In Brillhart, the
Excess Insurance Co. of America brought a declaratory judgment action in 1940 to de-
termine its rights under a 1932 reinsurance contract made with Central Mutual Insur-
ance Co. of Chicago. Under that contract, Excess agreed to reimburse Central, within
specified limits, for any "ultimate net loss" sustained by Central under certain liability
policies. Central undertook to notify Excess of any accident that might be covered by the
policies. In 1934, Central issued a liability policy to Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. Later that year,
Brillhart's decedent was killed by a truck leased by Cooper-Jarrett. Brillhart brought suit
against Cooper-Jarrett in a Missouri state court. Central refused to defend the suit on
grounds that the policy did not cover the accident.
While the suit was pending, both Central and Cooper-Jarrett encountered financial
difficulties. Central was liquidated and all claims against it barred by order of an Illinois
state court. Cooper-Jarrett filed a reorganization petition in a Missouri district court and
the proceeding's final decree discharged it from any past or future judgment by Brillhart.
In 1939, Brillhart obtained a twenty-thousand dollar default judgment against Cooper-
Jarrett, who had abandoned defense of the suit. Brillhart subsequently instituted garnish-
ment proceedings against Central in a Missouri state court. Being unable to recover any
part of the judgment from either Cooper-Jarrett or Central, Brillhart then made Excess a
party to the garnishment proceeding in 1940.
Meanwhile, Excess filed a declaratory judgment action in the Kansas federal district
court. Excess alleged that it could not be obligated under the reinsurance contract be-
cause Central violated the terms by failing to notify Excess of the fatal accident and
that, in any event, the default judgment had been fraudulently obtained. Jurisdiction was
based on diversity of citizenship.
Brillhart moved to dismiss the suit primarily because the issues involved in the federal
suit could now be decided in the pending Missouri state court garnishment proceeding.
The district court dismissed the suit likely because of a reluctance to prolong the litiga-
tion; it had been six years since the decedent's death. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held that dismissal of the suit was an abuse of discretion. However, instead of
remitting the case for a proper exercise of district court discretion, the court of appeals
reversed the judgment with instructions that the district court proceed to a redetermina-
tion on the merits. The Supreme Court then took the case. Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 492-94.
41. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
42. Id. at 498; Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367.
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relevant principles.
43
While incorporating the three Brillhart principles, Chamberlain
developed an additional prong for the court to balance: the interest
in avoiding piecemeal litigation.4 Chamberlain involved a situation
where only the federal court could adjudicate the entire case.45 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit held the federal district court properly and effi-
ciently exercised its jurisdiction. The Chamberlain court further
noted that "[t]he pendency of a state action, however, does not of
itself require a district court to refuse declaratory relief in federal
court. 4 6
Chamberlain considerably narrowed the discretion that district
courts in the Ninth Circuit have to issue declaratory relief. Under
Chamberlain, district courts ordinarily should decline to grant de-
claratory relief where a state suit is pending concerning the same
issues and parties, unless the suit is governed by federal law.47 As a
result, the court abandoned the relatively high threshold of "ex-
traordinary circumstances" required to justify abstention under Col-
orado River. Consequently, a federal court can abstain more readily
from exercising jurisdiction in suits involving the Declaratory Judg-
ments Act than in suits involving coercive relief.48
43. Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 498.
44. Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1368.
45. Chamberlain involved a quasi-marital agreement to share all property acquired
by the "community" during a twelve-and-a-half-year relationship. Chamberlain's ex-
partner filed a lawsuit against him in state court. Chamberlain tendered to Allstate the
underlying suit and requested indemnity and a defense. Frustrated by Allstate's slow
reaction, Chamberlain filed a state court action based on bad faith. Subsequently, All-
state removed Chamberlain's state action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction
and filed a counterclaim for declaratory relief. Chamberlain appealed the district court's
summary judgments in favor of Allstate on Chamberlain's bad faith claim and on All-
state's counterclaim for declaratory relief. Id. at 1363.
Even if the district court had refrained from exercising its jurisdiction over Allstate's
declaratory relief claim, the district court would have still had to exercise its jurisdiction
over Chamberlain's bad faith suit. In order to adjudicate the bad faith suit, the district
court had to determine the scope of the policy's coverage under California law. Thus,
whether the district court decided the entire controversy, or refrained from deciding a
part of it, major issues necessarily had to be decided in federal court. Id. at 1366-67.
46. Id. at 1367.
47. Id. at 1366-67.
48. Coercive remedies involve both damages and injunctions. This involves any un-
derlying suit that seeks a specific remedy: damages, a court order, an injunction, or re-
plevin restitution. Injunctions and similiar court orders are coercive remedies. Coercive
and declaratory remedies are closely related. Both are designed to prevent harm before it
happens, so that the issue of compensation never arises. Both are preventative remedies.
The most important preventative remedy is the injunction. An injunction is a court order
which orders litigants to do or refrain from doing something specific. In contrast, declar-
atory remedies authoritatively resolve disputes regarding the party's rights, but do not
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit significantly expanded
the Brillhart and Chamberlain abstention principles in Robsac. In
Robsac, the court identified a five-prong inquiry for determining the
propriety of abstention in declaratory relief cases. 49 The inquiry con-
siders: (1) the interest in avoiding needless federal court determina-
tions of state law; (2) the interest in avoiding the use by litigants of
declaratory judgment actions as a means of forum shopping; (3) the
interest in avoiding duplicative litigation; (4) the interest in avoiding
piecemeal litigation; and (5) the interest in avoiding violation of the
spirit, if not the letter, of the diversity removal provision.5" This new
test extends the Brillhart and Chamberlain principles, forming a
comprehensive Ninth Circuit guideline for exercising jurisdiction in
declaratory judgment actions. Thus, Robsac expands and defines a
fifth branch of abstention doctrine.
III. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO. v. ROBSAC INDUSTRIES
A. Case Facts
Robsac Industries (Robsac), a California corporation, sold art
supplies in its stores throughout the United States until it filed for
bankruptcy in January 1987.51 Continental Casualty Co. ("Conti-
nental"), an Illinois corporation, issued an insurance policy to Rob-
sac in 1984.52
In September, 1986, Robsac notified Continental of a potential
theft loss. 53 As instructed by Continental, Robsac investigated the
loss and submitted an official "proof of loss" form to Continental in
June 1987.11 Continental denied Robsac's claim on November 25,
1987. 55
On December 2, 1987, Robsac filed a breach of contract suit
against Continental in Los Angeles Superior Court.56 Robsac also
end in an immediate direct order to the defendant. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMNER-
ICAN REMEDIES 3 (1985).
49. The development of the Robsac 5-prong inquiry can be traced to prior case
law. The first three factors were developed in Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 494. The fourth
factor was added by Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367. Finally, the fifth factor was sug-
gested in Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1371-73.
50. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1370-74.
51. Id. at 1368.
52. Id. The insurance policy was issued to Robsac along with five other named
subsidiaries.
53. Id.
54. Id. As instructed by Robsac's insurance agent, Robsac hired a private investi-
gator to investigate the claim. Robsac submitted the official "proof of loss" form to Con-
tinental on June 17, 1987. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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named as defendants "Does 1 through 50" identified as fifty of Con-
tinental's managerial-level employees." The parties agreed that
some of the employees worked and resided in California." Under the
prevailing diversity removal statute, the presence of the Doe defend-
ants destroyed complete diversity.5 9 Thus, Continental was unable to
remove the suit to federal court.6 0
Twenty-six days later, Continental filed a declaratory judgment
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Illinois.61 Continental sought a declaration that it was not liable on
the policy. The sole basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction was
diversity of citizenship. 2
On June 1, 1988, Robsac moved to stay the federal action or, al-
ternatively, to transfer it to the the Central District of California.
Robsac's alternative motion was granted, and the case was trans-
ferred to the California federal court.63
Continental moved for summary judgment on June 6, 1988.4
Continental argued that Robsac had either assigned its entire inter-
est in the claim to a third party or waived any remaining interest.6 5
On March 7, 1989, Robsac again moved to stay the federal action,
57. Id. at 1368-69, 1372 n.5.
58. Id. at 1369.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988); see Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 844 F.2d 602, 605
(9th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
60. Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or resi-
dence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of
the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of
the State in which such action is brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988) (emphasis added). While Robsac was pending, Congress
amended the diversity removal provision. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Jus-
tice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988). The amendment provided that
citizenship is unaffected by the presence of Doe defendants. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
(1988) ("For purposes of removal under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued
under fictitious names shall be disregarded."). This amendment, if in effect in December
1987, would have permitted Robsac to remove the case to federal court at that time.
61. Continental Casualty Co. v. Robsac Indus., 947 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1991).
Continental filed its declaratory judgment action on December 28, 1987.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. "Continental argued that Robsac had assigned its entire interest in the
claim to a third party or had waived any remaining interest, and that in any event Rob-
sac" failed to "introduce any admissible evidence to prove its alleged theft loss". Id.
65. Id.
this time before the California district court.6  At this point the fed-
eral proceedings had progressed further than the state proceedings.67
Robsac's motion to stay based upon the pendency of the state pro-
ceedings was summarily denied on April 3, 1989.8
The district court heard Continental's summary judgment motion
on April 28, 1989. The court entered judgment in favor of Continen-
tal and against Robsac on the assignment-waiver issue. 9 Robsac ap-
pealed the district court's entry of summary judgment on
Continental's declaratory relief action and its summary denial of
Robsac's motion to stay pending the outcome of state proceedings. 70
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that because of the pending state action, the district court
should have refrained from exercising jurisdiction to grant declara-
tory relief.7'
B. Opinion
A divided Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's entry of sum-
mary judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case.72
The court held that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction con-
travened the exercise of sound judicial discretion. 73 The court further
held that "[c]ourts should generally decline to assert jurisdiction in
insurance coverage and other declaratory relief actions presenting
only issues of state law during the pendency of parallel proceedings
in state court. 74
After a brief review of decisional law since Colorado River, the
court reaffirmed its holding in Chamberlain that Colorado River
principles are entirely inapplicable to suits brought under the De-
claratory Judgments Act.7 5 The court then stated that Brillhart con-
trols declaratory relief actions. Brillhart provides for de novo review
as opposed to Colorado River's abuse of discretion standard.7 6 The
court elected to conduct the review itself, in lieu of remanding the
case to the district court for reconsideration.7
66. Id. This time Robsac made "its motion before the United States District Court
for the Central District of California." Id.
67. Id. at 1376 (Hall, J., dissenting).
68. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1369.
69. Id. "The court did not reach the underlying question whether Continental was
liable (to Robsac or an assignee) under the policy. Robsac made an untimely motion for
a new trial or in the alternative, for reconsideration, which the court denied." Id.
70. Id.




75. Id. at 1369.
76. Id. at 1370.
77. Id.
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Robsac asserted that the district court had abused its discretion by
granting declaratory relief during the pendency of the state court
proceedings."8 The court of appeals found that in light of Robsac's
stay request, Brillhart's "sound judicial discretion" standard re-
quired abstention. 9 The court applied a five-prong test in determin-
ing whether the exercise of jurisdiction was proper.80
First, the court asked whether exercising federal jurisdiction
would frustrate the policy of avoiding unnecessary declarations of
state law. State law provided the rule of decision in this diversity
case."1 Because the case involved insurance law, the court found that
a complex scheme of state administrative processes and insurance
regulation was involved.8 2 The dependence on complex state adminis-
trative schemes supported resolution by the state court. Further, the
court noted the federal interest is at its "nadir" when the "sole basis
for jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship." 83 Thus, the court found
the policy of avoiding unnecessary declarations of state law espe-
cially strong here.84
Second, in analyzing the interest in avoiding forum shopping, the
court focused on the potentially "'defensive' or 'reactive' nature of a
federal declaratory judgment suit."8a5 "Defensive or reactive" litiga-
tion may be characterized as a vexatious tactical maneuver based on
a contrived federal claim or an attempt to avoid adverse rulings
The record does not indicate why the district court decided to exercise its
jurisdiction .... [W]e review de novo the district court's decision to exercise
its jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgments Act when a state action is
pending.".... We may conduct that review now or remand and delay doing so
until after another appeal is taken. Whether we retain jurisdiction and proceed
to decide the issue before us or whether we remand to the district court ...,
ultimately we will still be obligated to exercise our own discretion in consider-
ing the propriety of the district court's grant or denial of declaratory relief
[W]e elect to review the district court's exercise of jurisdiction now.
Id. (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 1369.
79. Id. at 1374.
80. Id. at 1370-74.
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988) ("The laws of the several states, except where
the Constitution on treaties of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as the rules of decisions in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply."); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (requiring federal
courts to apply the substantive law of the forum state in diversity actions).
82. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1371 (discussing the fact that this case involves insurance




made by the state court.8 6 Such a posture encourages forum shop-
ping in an effort to gain a tactical advantage from the application of
federal court rules and, therefore, would justify abstention.87 Re-
gardless of whether an insurer's declaratory relief action was filed
first or second, the court labeled such actions "reactive" and found
abstention appropriate.88
Third, the court found that because the federal declaratory relief
suit mirrored the state suit, to permit the federal suit to proceed
would frustrate the policy of avoiding duplicative litigation.8 9 Be-
cause the state court could resolve all the issues presented by the
declaratory relief action, allowing the federal action to proceed
would waste judicial resources.90
Fourth, the court noted that piecemeal litigation would result if
the federal court determined Robsac's rights against Continental,
but not against the individual defendants who were not parties to the
federal action.9 1 Thus, complete relief seemed available exclusively
within the state court.
Fifth, the court considered the federal interest in maintaining the
spirit of the diversity removal provision. The court asserted that al-
lowing the action to proceed would violate "the spirit" of diversity
jurisdiction." Because the state suit included nondiverse parties, al-
lowing the federal action to proceed would "sanction partial
removal." 93
86. Reactive litigation may occur in response to a claim an insurer believes is not
subject to coverage although the" claimant has not yet filed his or her state court action:
the insurer may anticipate that its insured intends to file a non-removeable state court
action and rush to file a federal action in a race to the courthouse. Id.
87. Id. "[I]f a declaratory judgment suit is defensive or reactive, that would justify
a court's decision not to exercise jurisdiction." Id.
88. A declaratory judgment action by an insurance company against its in-
sured during the pendency of a non-removeable state court action presenting the
same issues of state law is an archetype of what we have termed "reactive"
litigation .... Whether, the federal declaratory judgment action regarding in-
surance coverage is filed first or second, it is reactive, and permitting it to go
forward when there is a pending state court case presenting the identical issue
would encourage forum shopping ....
Id. at 1372-73 (quoting Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Digregorio, 811 F.2d
1249, 1254 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987)); but cf. Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 772 F.2d
534, 542-43 (9th Cir. 1985) ("We see nothing invidious about a plaintiff filing suit in
federal court before his opponent files a similiar suit in state court .... For those plain-
tiffs with diversity, that preference is their right.") (citations omitted). The Mobil Oil
court further noted that "attempts to characterize the federal diversity suits as "reac-
tive" or "vexatious" are unwarranted, and that the plaintiff "is no more entitled to its
choice of forum" than the defendant. Id. at 542-43.




93. Id. "To permit the present declaratory judgment action to proceed while there
are non-diverse defendants in the state suit who are not parties to the federal action
would be to sanction partial removal in all but name." Id.
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Finally, the court applied the Brillhart presumption that the state
court should hear the entire suit.94 Failing to find any factors favor-
ing federal jurisdiction sufficient to rebut this presumption, the court
held abstention to be proper.9 5
One judge dissented. She observed that the majority's decision
would have a crippling effect upon the district courts' independent
exercise of jurisdiction. 6 She noted that creating a per se rule that
insurers' requests for federal declaratory relief are "reactive" and to
require abstention will deter district courts from the discretionary
exercise of jurisdiction.
IV. ANALYSIS
Robsac utilizes the Brillhart and Chamberlain principles to signif-
icantly expand existing abstention doctrine. Robsac extended these
principles by concluding that the involvement of solely state law, and
pending parallel state proceedings between the same parties, gener-
ally requires district court abstention." Prior to Robsac, rulings such
as Brillhart and Chamberlain combined to create a balancing test
which was applied fact-specifically, with no single dispositive fac-
tor.99 Robsac, however, appears to adopt a broad general rule, re-
quiring a high threshold of justification to avoid its application.
First, in finding that a complex administrative scheme is impli-
cated by the presence of settled insurance law issues, the court ren-
ders all federal declaratory relief suits involving issues of solely state
law vulnerable to abstention. 0 BrilIhart involved unsettled state
94. Id.; see Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367 ("[W]hen a party requests declara-
tory relief in federal court and a suit is pending in state court presenting the same issues,
there exists a presumption that the entire suit should be heard in state court.").
95. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1374.
96. Id. at 1378 (Hall, J., dissenting). "There is no escaping the conclusion that in
the future, district courts will feel bound by this decision and choose not to take jurisdic-
tion over declaratory judgment actions by insurers." Id.
97. Judge Hall takes issue with the majority's characterization of "defensive or
reactive" litigation as a dispositive factor in determining whether to grant declaratory
relief, as opposed to only one of several factors a court must balance. Id. at 1377.
98. Id. at 1374. "Courts should generally decline to assert jurisdiction in insur-
ance coverage and other declaratory relief actions presenting only issues of state law
during the pendency of parallel proceedings in state court." Id.
99. Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 494; Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367; see also Moses
H. Cone., 460 U.S. at 16.
100. Robsac extends the Brillhart factor of avoiding needless determinations of
state law which was formerly implicated only when complex state law issues were
presented. This factor now extends to all parallel state court proceedings in which state
law provides the rule of decision. Thus, all diversity cases may be deemed to implicate
garnishment law, which the federal court would have had to predict
in order to resolve the suit.101 The Court held that such state law
determinations were properly for the individual states to decide.10 2
Unlike Brillhart, Robsac involved a factual dispute over whether
the appellant had an ownership interest in the policy at the time the
claim was filed. 10 3 The court was not called upon to decide any un-
settled issues of state law. Further, no important state law question
or sensitive area of state policy was at issue, such as the water rights
in Colorado River. 04 When litigants properly invoke their jurisdic-
tion, the federal courts have a duty to decide questions of state law
whenever necessary to render a judgment. 10 The Ninth Circuit
court, however, asserted that the complex nature of the law involved
justified deference to the state court. 06 As the dissent so eloquently
states, "[S]urely the majority does not mean to suggest that every
breach of contract claim against an insurer requires a court to plumb
the depths of some byzantine administrative apparatus." 07 Robsac
may not implicate the first principle of avoiding unnecessary declara-
tions of state law at all. Yet, the majority found this prong especially
strong.
In linking settled local insurance law with complex administrative
schemes, the court effectively suggests that all matters involving
solely state law belong within state courts. 08 Robsac essentially cre-
ates a per se rule because in diversity cases state law almost always
provides the rule of decision. 0 9 Therefore, all diversity cases which
implicate complex state law issues to the same degree Robsac did
will always weigh heavily in favor of abstention.
Second, the Robsac court accorded great weight to the "reactive"
this factor and counsel against jurisdiction regarding requests for federal declaratory re-
lief. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1371.
101. Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 497. "It is not our function to find our way through a
maze of local statutes and decisions on so technical and specialized a subject as the scope
of garnishment proceedings in a particular jurisdiction .... [I]t is too easy to lose our
way." Id.
102. Id.
103. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1368-69. This case is essentially a factual dispute over
whether, at the time the claim was filed, Robsac had an ownership interest in the policy.
104. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820 (discussing the state's extensive involvement
in state water rights and the McCarran Amendment which justify the district court's
dismissal). The Court also found significant the apparent absence of any district court
proceedings beyond the filing of a complaint prior to the motiom to dismiss. Id.
105. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). "[lIt has from the first
been deemed to be the duty of the federal courts, if their jurisdiction is properly invoked,
to decide questions of state law whenever necessary to the rendition of a judgment." Id.
106. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1371.
107. Id. at 1376 (Hall, J., dissenting).
108. See supra note 100.
109. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1371.
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nature of Continental's claim.'10 The court asserted that the charac-
terization of litigation as "defensive or reactive" was sufficient to
warrant abstention."' The court then proceeded to classify declara-
tory relief actions by insurers generally as "reactive," regardless of
whether the insurer filed suit first or second." 2 As a practical mat-
ter, this creates a per se rule that insurers' requests for federal de-
claratory relief against insureds are "reactive" and, thus, should be
viewed with suspicion or denied federal relief completely.
Third, in examining the potential for duplicative litigation, the
court placed no weight on the relative stages of the two actions. At
the time Robsac filed its second motion to stay, the federal proceed-
ings had progressed further than the state proceedings." 3 In deter-
mining whether abstention is proper, a relevant inquiry is the
priority of the respective proceedings and whether "substantial pro-
ceedings" have occurred in the state court such that a waste of judi-
cial resources is likely to occur." 4 As the United States Supreme
Court has noted, "Priority should not be measured exclusively by
which complaint was filed first, but rather in terms of how much
progress has been made in the two actions."'' 15 Continental filed its
federal suit only twenty-six days after Robsac filed its state action.
The federal suit had progressed much further than the parallel state
suit.,16
Brilihart provides a general presumption in favor of state court
proceedings when the parallel federal action involves the same state
110. Id. at 1372. Nowhere has the Supreme Court sanctioned abstention on the
ground of vexatious litigation. See Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the
Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEo. L.J. 99, 109-13 (1986) (discussing how the lower federal
court quietly added the element of vexatious litigation as a basis for abstention in the
case of Will v. Calvert, 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977)).
111. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1371. "'[T]he "defensive" or reactive nature of a federal
declaratory judgment suit' . . . would justify a court's decision not to exercise jurisdic-
tion." Id. (quoting Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. Digregorio, 811 F.2d
1249, 1254 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987)).
112. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
113. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1376 (Hall, J., dissenting).
114. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21-22. In Moses H. Cone, no substantial
proceedings had taken place at the time of the decision to stay the federal action. In
contrast, the parties had taken most of the necessary steps to resolution of the issue and
the federal suit was running well ahead of the state suit at the time the district court
refused to adjudicate the suit. The appeals court reversed the district court's stay order
and remanded the case with instructions to enter an order to arbitrate. Id. at 8; cf Colo-
rado River, 424 U.S. at 820. Although the federal suit was filed first, "the apparent
absence of any proceedings in the District Court, other than the filing of the complaint,
prior to the motion to dismiss" was a factor favoring dismissal. 460 U.S. at 8.
115. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21.
116. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
law issues."' In Brillhart, the parallel federal action was filed sev-
eral years after the underlying state action.'1 8 Consequently, a pre-
sumption in favor of state court retention of jurisdiction seems
particularly appropriate to avoid disruption of an ongoing suit in
which the parties had invested several years. Before adoption of the
Brillhart principles, the Ninth Circuit had dismissed a declaratory
relief claim sought in the midst of ongoing state court litigation be-
gun three years earlier." 9 Therefore, regardless of the branch of ab-
stention doctrine, standard of review, or method of analysis, courts
have generally refused to allow a declaratory relief claim'to disrupt
an ongoing action in which parties have invested many years.
In Robsac, however, both the state and federal actions were filed
within the same month.'20 Under Colorado River analysis, the Ninth
Circuit has held it to be an abuse of discretion to stay a federal
action in favor of an "almost simultaneously" filed state court action
which was neither in an advanced state nor more actively pursued by
the plaintiffs.' The filing date and order of priority becomes a neu-
tral consideration when neither case has significantly progressed.
Even when the state action is filed first, there is no compelling reason
for giving priority to the state in the absence of a heavy investment
of resources in the state action.
Likewise, it seems logical to extend the Ninth Circuit's neutral
treatment of the filing priority factor regarding actions filed "almost
simultaneously" to Robsac.22 Merely twenty-six days had elapsed
117. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
118. Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 492-93.
119. Shell Oil v. Frusetta, 290 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1961).
120. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
121. See Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 706 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1983)
(state action filed on day after the federal action); cf. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Madonna,
914 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1990) (the district court found the priority factor neutral be-
cause the state action was filed three days before the federal action).
122. A twenty-six day lapse between the filing of successive complaints should be
treated equally under both Colorado River and Brillhart analysis. Colorado River analy-
sis treats actions filed in close succession as a neutral factor because of the nonexistence
of investment of resources to be given weight. The finding of a neutral factor furnishes a
neutral presumption. The ascertainment of how much weight a specific factor has, or
whether a factor is neutral, is unaffected by the underlying presumptions of the respec-
tive doctrines. For example, assuming all factors were neutral, apply the underlying pre-
sumptions that: (I) Colorado River would discourage abstention, and (2) Brillhart would
not discourage abstention. Although cases arising under Colorado River and Brillhart
may differ regarding the subsequent treatment of a neutral factor, the value of protecting
state court investment does not vary between the two types of cases. Consequently, the
absence of any significant state court investment in Robsac suggests that the order and
priority of filing was a neutral factor raising a neutral presumption. Thus, nothing favors
abstention because of the absence of any state court investment.
Further, applying a strong presumption in favor of state court jurisdiction is difficult to
justify absent any: (I) involvement of complex or unsettled state law as in Brillhart, 316
U.S. at 494; (2) important state policy such as the water rights in Colorado River, 424
U.S. at 820; or (3) a heavy investment of resources, judicial or otherwise, as in the three-
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between the filing of the respective suits in Robsac. In contrast, Brill-
hart involved a span of several years between suits and the court
record indicated a reluctance to further prolong litigation as a per-
suasive consideration in the court's decision to abstain.123 Thus, the
propriety of applying the Brillhart pro-state court presumption in
cases not involving a heavy investment of resources in the parallel
state action appears less persuasive.
Furthermore, permitting the federal action to proceed in Robsac
may have resulted in a net gain in judicial resources.2 4 The federal
action was more advanced than the parallel state action. By proceed-
ing to judgment, the federal court could have resolved the issues
sooner, without the need for the state court to address the same is-
sues already settled in federal court. It is unclear whether permitting
the federal action to proceed would have wasted additional judicial
resources. On the contrary, assuming a similiar state court outcome,
no further state court action regarding the Doe defendants would
have been necessary, and the federal action may have more effi-
ciently disposed of the entire suit.
Fourth, by allowing the federal action to progress the court's inter-
est in avoiding piecemeal litigation also may have been satisfied. The
relevant inquiry is whether the Doe defendants named by Robsac
belonged in the action. 25 It is curious that while Robsac sued a
wealthy insurer, it also chose to join the shallow pockets of Conti-
nental's managers. If one believes that the Does in fact belonged in
the suit, then piecemeal litigation will result from federal court re-
tention of the action because the federal court cannot grant complete
relief.' 26 If, however, the Does did not belong in the suit, then there
were only two real parties in the lawsuit, Robsac and Continental.
Either court could have afforded complete relief. Under the latter
view, resolution of the dispute, in its entirety would have been availa-
ble in the federal forum and the court's argument against complete
disposal of the case becomes far less compelling.
Similarly, the court asserted that permitting the federal action to
year span between actions in Frusetta, 290 F.2d at 689.
123. See supra note 40.
124. Even if one is willing to dismiss the idea of local prejudice to the foreign party
and assume a similiar outcome in thq state court, permitting the federal court to retain
jurisdiction would ultimately preserve judicial resources because the dispute had already
been resolved in the federal court.
125. If the only real parties were Robsac and Continental; then the federal court
could have completely disposed of this issue because all the interested parties were before
the court.
126. In such case, the Does can only appear before the state court.
proceed would violate "the spirit, if not the letter" of the diversity
removal provision and would sanction partial removal. 127 After Con-
tinental had filed its declaratory relief action, Congress amended the
diversity removal provision specifically to provide that the presence
of Doe defendants does not destroy complete diversity for removal
purposes."" Because the court perceived a tactical maneuver by
Continental to defeat Robsac's choice of forum, it proceeded to nar-
row the availability of federal jurisdiction in declaratory relief ac-
tions when particular parties are involved. 29
When it required complete diversity for removal, Congress had de-
cided that the presence of one local defendant sufficiently eliminates
any chance of local prejudice. 30 In cases involving a nondiverse de-
fendant under the old removal statute, removal only applied when
either the diverse party had a separate and independant claim from
the nondiverse party, or the nondiverse party had been fraudulently
joined to prevent removal, as by joining fictitious Does.131 Thus, the
declaratory relief action served to either circumvent the complete di-
versity rule or retaliate against a plaintiff who had tried to prevent
removal by joining Doe defendants. The artificial destruction of di-
versity deprives an opposing litigant of the right to access the federal
courts. 13 2 The crucial inquiry becomes whether the Does are in fact
fictional. This may be determined by questioning whether the nondi-
verse parties belong in the suit.'33 It is unclear whether Continental's
managers belonged in Robsac's suit.
Now, under the amended removal statute, complete diversity is
only destroyed, and removal prevented, if a real party, as opposed to
127. See supra note 93.
128. See supra note 60.
129. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1371. "The present suit was filed in federal court be-
cause the insurer apparently perceived a tactical advantage from litigating in a federal
forum." Id.
130. This is the complete diversity rule. In multiparty suits, the presence of a sin-
gle plaintiff who is a citizen of the same state as any defendant will defeat diversity. 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1988). The complete diversity rule was first enunciated by Chief Justice
Marshall in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (construing the lan-
guage of the 1789 Judiciary Act).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988). The federal courts have been willing, upon a show-
ing that a joined nondiverse defendant lacks any real connection to the litigation, to
"pierce the guise of nondiversity" and permit removal. JACK A. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.7, at 42 (1985); see, e.g., Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 25
U.S. 92 (1921); Wecker v. National Enameling and Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176 (1907);
Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 294 F. Supp. 815 (S.D. Ga. 1968).
132. JACK A. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.7, at 38-39 (1985).
133. Under certain circumstances, the federal court may disregard joinder and re-
tain jurisdiction when such joinder is used as a fraudulent device to prevent removal. See
Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92 (1921); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.
v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146 (1914); Cox v. Early, 65 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1933); Picquet v.
Amoco Prod. Co., 513 F. Supp. 938 (M.D. La. 1981); Bernblum v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 9
F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Mo. 1934).
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a Doe defendant, is nondiverse. 34 Only those parties who cannot re-
move their suits will file declaratory judgment actions." 5 Such ac-
tions will involve only real parties because Does will not prevent
removal. 36 Every declaratory relief claim filed by a person already
sued in a state court will now involve a nondiverse party who is
before the state court but who cannot be brought before the federal
court via removal. Therefore, because the issue will arise only when
the state court case involves a nondiverse party, Robsac's rule
against incomplete relief is tantamount to a per se rule that compels
abstention.'
The real issue in the Robsac case should be which party attempted
to live up to the spirit of the removal statute and which party at-
tempted to manipulate it.3 8 If the named Does were in fact fictional,
then Robsac attempted to manipulate the removal statute through a
technicality, as the presence of nondiverse Does prevented Continen-
tal from removing the action to federal court. 3 " Therefore, Robsac's
attempt to exploit this statute warrants scrutiny.
The court's argument that Continental attempted to circumvent
the removal statute relies on an anachronism. Continental did not
circumvent the removal statute based on the newly amended provi-
sion.140 This new provision even more clearly expressed Congress' in-
tent to permit federal jurisidiction via removal regardless of whether
any fictional Does exist.' 4 ' Thus, Robsac's tactics should not prevent
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988).
135. Because the federal courts' exercise of jurisdiction under the removal provi-
sion is mandatory, as opposed to discretionary, litigants seeking a federal forum will
likely choose removal to ensure federal jurisdiction. See supra notes 17 and 32 and ac-
companying text.
136. Only those defendants who are unable to remove will seek a federal forum by
way of requesting federal declaratory relief. Such actions will necessarily involve a nondi-
verse defendant that is simultaneously before a state court because otherwise, complete
diversity would exist and the case could be removed.
137. Every declaratory relief action will likely involve a nondiverse defendant who
is unable to come before the federal court. See supra notes 135-36. Thus, a rule which
counsels against jurisdiction when fewer than all parties can appear before the federal
court will likely bar most declaratory relief actions.
138. The Robsac court completely ignores this issue.
139. Joining the Does destroyed complete diversity under the pre-amended diver-
sity removal provision.
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988).
141. Congress' intent is clearly to prevent the defeat of complete diversity by the
presence of Doe defendants regardless of whether the Does are added only to destroy
diversity or represent real parties not yet discovered or served.
removal. If the Does were in fact fictional, Continental did not at-
tempt to circumvent removal even under the old removal provi-
sion. 42 In that case, Robsac tried to exploit the removal statute
through a technicality.
A possible alternative to Robsac's strict rule is a case-by-case
analysis as opposed to essentially a per se rule. This requires an in-
quiry into whether the nondiverse party truly belongs in the present
suit or is merely joined to artificially destroy diversity to deny an
opposing litigant access to the federal courts. 143 If the nondiverse
party does in fact belong in the suit, the case should be heard in the
state court. Congress has intended state courts to hear such cases
.because the presence of a local defendant eliminates any risk of
prejudice.1 44 If, in this case, Continental tried to circumvent the re-
moval provision, the case should be sent back to the state court. If,
however, Robsac tried to exploit the removal statute, then Robsac
should be penalized and its choice of forum denied.
Acting as guardian in protecting plaintiff Robsac's initial choice of
a state forum, the court used abstention principles to deny Continen-
tal's attempt to secure a federal forum, even though Congress has
expressly provided for removal. 45 Until Congress chooses to amend
the removal statutes to bar insurers and other "defensive or reactive"
litigants from invoking diversity jurisdiction, the foreign insurer is
entitled to the benefits of a federal forum. 146 Absent an amendment
by Congress, when litigants have met the diversity requirements, the
courts should not act to bar access to the federal courts in an effort
to further "the spirit" of diversity jurisdiction. 147 In Robsac, the
court undermined congressional efforts to grant a federal forum; it
did not protect the spirit of the Congressional Act.
Because Congress has not abolished diversity jurisdiction, it must
still believe that the state courts may fail to protect foreign parties
from local prejudice. The Robsac court argued that the state court
could adequately resolve the issue and should be shown deference by
the federal court.1 48 Continental, however, is in fact a foreign party
and as such should be able to exercise its right to a federal forum to
avoid local prejudice. Only Congress can abolish diversity jurisdic-
tion. Until it does, the parties are entitled to exercise their rights
142. If in fact the Does were joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction, then such de-
fendants are not "properly joined" within the meaning of the diversity removal statute
and, thus, ought to be disregarded for purposes of determining diversity of citizenship.
See supra note 60.
143. See supra note 133.
144. See supra note 130.
145. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988).
146. See supra note 110.
147. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1373.
148. Id. at 1373-74.
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under existing diversity jurisdiction and removal provisions.' 49
Finally, Robsac further erodes the degree of discretion retained by
the district courts in granting declaratory relief. In choosing to re-
view the case de novo, as opposed to remanding to the district court
for reconsideration, the Robsac court failed to exhibit any deference
to the lower court's exercise of discretion. 150 Because of an incom-
plete record, the appeals court was unable to consider those factors
which the lower court found persuasive in choosing to grant relief.151
Allowing the lower court to make its own redetermination would
leave the district court's discretion intact. 52 By opting to consider
the case itself, however, the appeals court further narrowed the dis-
trict court's discretion to grant declaratory relief.
By adopting, in essence, a per se rule in place of a fact-specific
balancing test, the court narrowed the window of federal forum op-
portunity for that category of litigants the court deems "defensive or
reactive" and thereby defines a new branch of abstention doctrine. 53
Such a rule heavily affects insurers, who are regarded by the court
as generally "reactive," among other potentially suspect groups who
may desire a neutral federal forum.5 This rule denies federal courts
the option of exercising their power under existing law.
V. CONCLUSION
The Declaratory Judgments Act provides the federal courts with
an additional discretionary remedy. The Act's central purpose is to
provide litigants an expedient and economical forum in which to
clarify legal relations and issues and to afford relief from uncer-
tainty. This purpose is achieved through a binding adjudication of
the rights and status of litigants, although no immediate consequent-
ial relief is awarded.155
The Robsac decision further encroached upon the district courts'
149. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 196-97
(1959) (quoting Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 513 (1897)) ("It exacts a severe
penalty from citizens for their attempt to exercise rights of access to the federal courts
granted them by Congress to deny them that promptness of decision which in all judicial
actions is one of the elements of justice.").
150. See supra note 77.
151. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1370.
152. The district court could have then applied the appellate courts' new standard
on remand in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction.
153. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1371-73. Those litigants the court deems "defensive or
reactive" are thus categorically denied access to the federal courts.
154. See supra note 87.
155. See supra note 48.
discretion to entertain declaratory actions during the pendency of
parallel state proceedings by expanding existing abstention principles
in three ways. First, it characterizes settled state insurance law as a
complex administrative scheme, thus placing it within the exclusive
province of the state.156 Second, it identifies a class of litigants as
"defensive or reactive" and justifies abstention when that class re-
quests declaratory relief."5 7 Third, it finds "the spirit of the diversity
removal provision" violated by the presence of fictional, non-diverse
Doe defendants. 158 Congress, however, has expressly provided that
the presence of Doe defendants has no effect upon citizenship for
removal purposes. 159
Robsac replaces the former fact-specific balancing tests of Brill-
hart and Chamberlain with a general rule. 60 Robsac requires ab-
stention in declaratory relief cases when parallel state proceedings
involving solely state law are pending, absent extenuating circum-
stances.' 6' The Robsac court proceeded to engage in a case-by-case
balancing approach, and yet it identified a whole category of liti-
gants to which it admonished the district courts to refuse relief.'0 2
Whether Robsac will in fact deter the district courts from exercising
their discretionary power under existing law to grant declaratory re-
lief in such instances remains an open question. Until it is answered,
the Ninth Circuit's message i clear: Any district court failing to
abstain from granting declaratp6ry relief during the pendency of par-
allel state proceedings, involving issues of solely state law, faces rig-
orous examination on appeal.
GIA L. HONNEN
156. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1371.
157. Id. at 1372.
158. Id. at 1373.
159. See supra note 60.
160. See supra note 3.
161. Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1374.
162. The litigants whom the court deems "defensive or reactive" are per se unde-
serving of a federal forum. Id. at 1372-73.
